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Abstract 
 
Despite the fact that the Nordic welfare model has become less exceptional in recent times, it con-
tinues to offer numerous examples for “best practices” in social policy provision, together with a 
high degree of welfare political legitimacy. This paper explores Nordic “benchmarking” as refer-
ence to the case of welfare development in Spain. In the general process of convergence of the 
European welfare states towards the middle, the Spanish case stands out as the one Mediterra-
nean EU country which has gone further in incorporating inputs and traits of the social-
democratic Nordic world of welfare capitalism. While Spain’s welfare state has become more lib-
eral in macroeconomic policies, and social policymaking has followed a pattern of universaliza-
tion of welfare entitlements and provision, there has been a detachment from the Bismarckian 
principle of income maintenance. This paper deals with Spain’s evolution in two main areas, 
which have distinctively characterized Nordic welfare in contemporary times: (1) fiscal resources, 
and (2) female employment. The analytical purpose of the first section is to ponder the claim as to 
whether or not Spanish welfare has intensified a socioeconomic path in the direction of the Nor-
dic model. Subsequently, Spain’s societal changes and welfare reforms are reviewed with relation 
to the two areas identified as having the greatest impact in the future evolution of Spain’s wel-
fare: conciliation of work and family life, and the territorial politics of welfare provision. Con-
cluding remarks speculate on the hypothesis that countries with fragmented political institutions 
and a decentralized state organization, such as Spain, may move faster and be more responsive in 
the development of new welfare polices. Likewise, the emergence of gender and family issues 
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   1. Introduction 
 
  More often than not, cross-national comparisons in welfare studies have failed to 
spell out clearly as reference point the dependent variable, the independent variable, or a 
co-integration of long-run relations of them. As a result, the choice of the reference point, 
or base-line, has repeatedly resulted in ethnocentric comparisons. It comes as no surprise 
that welfare state studies have tended to be rather Nordic-centric and, in particular, 
Swedish-centric (Esping-Andersen, 1993). The fact that the Nordic systems of social pro-
tection had already in the 1970s reached advanced levels of welfare maturation led to the 
canonic assumption that they constituted the very model of reference for other social sys-
tems. However, late developments in the European Union have confirmed that challenges 
and problems faced by advanced welfare states in the “Old Continent” are increasingly 
common and the range of options to tackle them is rather akin. The Nordic welfare model 
has thus become less exceptional, despite that it continues to offer numerous examples for 
“best practices” in social-policy provision together with a high degree of welfare political 
legitimacy. In this paper I explore Nordic “benchmarking” as reference to the case of 
Spain’s welfare development in recent years. 
 
Table 1: Social Expenditure as Percentage of GDP (EU-15) 
 
   1990  1995  1998  2002  2005 
Continental 
Europe  
29.6  30.1  28.8 29.3  29.5
Nordic 
countries 
28.1  32.1  30.1 28.8  28.2
Southern 
Europe 
18.0  22.2  23.7 24.6  24.1
United 
Kingdom 
24,3  27.7  26.8 27.6  26.8
Average  
EU-15 
N.A.  27.7  27.1 27.4  27.8
Notes: Unweighted averages. 
Continental Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands; Nordic countries: Den-
mark, Finland, Norway, Sweden; Southern Europe: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain. 
Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/).  
 
  European welfare states are in a process of convergence towards the middle con-
cerning, among other indicators: income inequality, public expenditure and social protec-
tion expenditure (see Table 1). Gini coefficients and the risk of poverty have been reduced 
slightly, while expenditures have risen in absolute terms (Adelantado and Calderón, 2006). 
The politics of the so-called “welfare retrenchment” have in fact translated into a general-
ized concern for “cost containment” which manifests itself in: (a) a hardening of the crite-
ria of access to and eligibility for welfare entitlements in Continental Europe; (b) a reduc-
tion of about 10 percent in the generous welfare benefits provided by Nordic welfare 
states; and (c) a transfer of responsibilities from the state public to the profit-making pri-
vate sector in the British welfare state (e.g., pensions) (Moreno and Palier, 2005). In all 
three instances, approaches to reform have been – at least partially – path-dependent on those ideas, institutions and interest upon which those welfare states were first built and 
later developed (Ferrera et al., 2000; Kuhnle, 2000; Pierson, 2001; Taylor-Gooby, 2001).  
 
  Indeed, the various programs of “recasting” and “recalibration” reflect a para-
mount concern for making viable the economic (fiscal) sustainability of welfare spending 
in EU countries (accounting for some 60 percent of total public expenditures) Main threats 
to such sustainability are: (1) increased internationalization of national economies; (2) 
higher relative costs of producing human services and social care (“Baumol’s disease”);1 
(3) “graying” of the population; (4) slower productivity growth in the private sector; (5) 
persistent unemployment and low employment rates; and (6) disincentive effects pro-
duced by the welfare state itself, including moral hazard (Lindbeck, 2006). 
 
  The “new” labor activation paradigm has been embraced all around within the 
European Union. It finds expression in two broad – but alternative – models for socioeco-
nomic performance: Anglo-Saxon deregulation and Nordic flexicurity. In the former, so-
cial policies have a limited role and their short-term paramount concern is to incite indi-
viduals to search actively for jobs, while facilitating a potential “reservation army.” In the 
latter, activation is meant to provide social services on a long-term perspective in an at-
tempt to break an equilibrium between individuals’ and society’s demands (Barbier, 2004; 
Serrano Pascual, 2007). 
 
  Given this context, the case of Spain displays interesting features of a rather am-
bivalent – and even syncretic – nature. The Spanish welfare state belongs to the Mediterra-
nean welfare regime. Social-demographic trends, institutional peculiarities, political re-
sources, socioeconomic backgrounds, patterns of public policy and value systems are rath-
er similar in the EU southern countries (Sarasa and Moreno, 1995; Ferrera, 1996; Rhodes, 
1997). They all experienced authoritarian and dictatorial rule (for longer periods in the 
case of Portugal and Spain), and have suffered from industrial “delays” in modern times 
(except for early industrialized areas in Italy and Spain) (Giner, 1986; Gunther et al., 1995; 
Morlino, 1998). The religious factor has had a structuring role in all four countries (Castles, 
1994; van Kersbergen, 1995), but the role of the “national” churches as main organizer of 
social protection has diminished.2 Recent comparative studies using multivariate 
statistical techniques indicate that Mediterranean countries maintain sharp differentiating 
characteristics with respect to other European welfare regimes.3  
                                                 
1This appears in wage increases in welfare jobs, such as those related to dependent citizens or edu-
cation, which follow those in sectors with faster productivity growth. Increased consumption of tax-
financed social services of primary care is usually expected to need higher taxes up to the point 
where the limit of the “Laffer curve” is reached, and then no further tax financing becomes techni-
cally feasible (Lindbeck, 2006). However, the situation in Spain and other Mediterranean EU coun-
tries in recent times must be qualified by the impact of “cheap labor” provided in this area of per-
sonal services by legal and illegal immigrants (Moreno Fuentes, 2007). 
2In Greece the ubiquitous Greek Orthodox church continues to be the most important form of pri-
vate action for the family and the poor (Symeonidou, 1997). The same applies to the Roman Catho-
lic Church – and its organization Caritas – in Italy, Portugal and Spain. However, state welfare has 
widely increased in the last decades, relegating the charitable action of the church to an important 
but complementary role. 
3An expanded analysis to EU-17 also confirms that South European countries continue to cluster 
robustly in a distinctive group (Vasconcelos Ferreira and Figueiredo, 2005) 
  2   As in other Southern European countries, Spain’s single most characteristic trait is 
the crucial role played by the family and its interpenetration in all areas of welfare produc-
tion and distribution.4 In particular, the role of women in providing – free of charge – a 
wide range of human services for the well-being of family members has been crucial for 
upholding tout court a distinct set of welfare arrangements in this world of welfare capital-
ism. Such family interpenetration contrasts with individual empowerment (liberal Anglo-
Saxon), statist egalitarianism (social-democratic Nordic) or institutional partnership (cor-
poratist Continental) as the core tenet for welfare provision in South European countries. 
The question remains as to whether or not the ongoing transformations will blur the speci-
fic characteristics of the Mediterranean welfare regime (Moreno, 2006). 
 
Table 2: Spain’s economic “catch-up” drive 
1959   1985   1998   2005* 
58.3%   70.6%   81.5%   95.5% 
Note: Per capita income (PPPs) as percentage of European mean 
* Euro-zone. The corresponding figure for EU-25 was 98.8%. 
 
  From the time of its accession to the EEC/UE in 1986, Spain’s economic growth ac-
celerated in order to catch up with the main European central economies (see Table 2). Evi-
dence has lent no support to the “social dumping” explanation for such an achievement 
(Guillén and Matsaganis, 2000). If anything, Spain offers a good example of a pattern of 
“leapfrogging,” or a very compressed transition from preindustrial to postindustrial socio-
economic structures (Ferrera, 2007). Spain has thus passed from semiperipheral to core 
status within the international economic order, and has deployed in such a process a 
“mixed market economy” variant of the “coordinated mixed economy” variety of contem-
porary capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
 
  In the early 1990s, Spain welfare development appeared as a via media between 
both corporatist Continental and liberal Anglo-Saxon worlds of welfare capitalism. Al-
ready then, it was incorporating inputs and traits of the social-democratic Nordic welfare 
typology (Moreno and Sarasa, 1992). Later on, while it has become more liberal in macro-
economic policies, and social policymaking has followed a pattern of universalization of 
welfare entitlements and provision, there has been a detachment from the Bismarckian 
principle of income maintenance.5  
 
  This paper mainly deals with Spain’s evolution in two main areas which have dis-
tinctively characterized Nordic welfare since the times of the trentes glorieuses, or “Golden 
Age” of welfare capitalism (1945-75): fiscal resources and female employment. The pur-
pose behind such analyses is to ponder the claim as to whether or not Spanish welfare has 
intensified a socioeconomic path in the direction of the Nordic model. Two indicators are 
                                                 
4In the Western world there are countries where families and family ties are relatively “strong,” 
while in others they are “weak.” Both Central and Northern Europe, together with the U.S., have 
been characterized by weak family links, and the Mediterranean nations by strong family ties. Ac-
cording to this view, differences have deep historical roots and are not diminishing in present times 
in any fundamental manner (Reher, 1998). 
5This shows clearly in the pensions system and the gradual establishment of a “safety net” of mini-
mum income, as well as in the higher equalization in pension payments (Arriba and Moreno, 2005; 
Sarasa, 2007). 
  3 singled out as providing the bases for comparison: increased taxation and female labor 
participation. How do Spain’s welfare developments compare with those Nordic bench-
marking references? The answer to this question focuses the attention of the next section of 
this paper. Subsequently, Spain’s societal changes and welfare reforms are reviewed in 
relation to the two areas identified as having the greatest impact in the future evolution of 
Spain’s welfare: conciliation of work and family life and the territorial politics of welfare 
provision. Concluding remarks speculate on the hypothesis that countries with fragment-
ed political institutions and a decentralized state organization may move faster and be 
more responsive in the development of new welfare polices. Likewise, the emergence of 
gender and family issues into the political arena is also regarded as generating pressure 
for major changes in Spain’s Mediterranean welfare, and possibly intensifying its Nordic 
path or component. 
 
2. Nordic welfare as a benchmarking reference 
 
  As already stated, matured welfare systems in Nordic Europe rests upon a wide 
range of welfare entitlements and social protection intensity. Their achievements have 
been postulated as “best practices” in order to offer solutions to Continental Europe’s 
problems and, in particular, to “newcomers” in the advanced worlds of welfare capitalism 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). This section explores the distance of Spain’s welfare with respect 
to that of their Nordic counterparts. It also attempts to answer to the question as to 
whether such a divergence has been reduced, maintained or widened. This paper cannot 
engage itself in a comprehensive and systematic comparison of all intervening variables. 
Arguably, it applies the view that the Nordic welfare achievements may be parsimoni-
ously packed into two main indicators of reference: (i) increased taxation, and (ii) women’s 
labor market participation (Abrahamson, 2007).  
 
  The analytical risks of over-determination in attempting to draw lessons from com-
paring numbers and digits from two single indicators cannot be underemphasized. How-
ever, and for the purposes of making plausible subsequent interpretations, evidence pro-
vided by figures and data of a general nature are included in order to illustrate the “Nor-
dic path” of Spanish welfare. 
 
2.1. Increases of taxation as percentage of GDP  
 
  A great deal of Nordic welfare provisions and institutional arrangements was 
made possible by the financial resources available for their implementation and structur-
ing during a long period of high public social expenditure. Certainly, high public expen-
diture does not translate into a generous welfare state. It is a necessary although not suffi-
cient condition. Yet, in postwar Scandinavia, highly legitimized governments with strong 
power resources have been able to implement generous welfare policies across-the-board 
(Korpi, 1983). 
 
  Tax levels of around 50 percent of GDP make Denmark and Sweden world record 
holders, while Finland and Norway with approximately 45 percent do not fall far behind. 
Among highly developed OECD countries, Nordic tax levels and structure stand out in 
comparison with the United States, where personal taxes and VAT are much lower, but 
where property taxes are higher. The overall tax burden in the U.S. is about half of what 
  4 we find in Scandinavia (Abrahamson, 2007). Nordic tax levels were also double those of 
Spain at the time of the demise of Franco’s dictatorship (1975). Currently they have been 
reduced to around one-third higher. Among the group of advanced industrial countries, 
Spain has increased most its level of taxation measured as percentage of GDP: 21 percent-
age points in the period 1965-2005 (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Total tax as percentage of GDP in selected countries (1965-2005). 
 
* 2004 
 1965  1975  1985  1995  2005  ▲65-05 
Denmark 29.9  39.3  46.5  48.8  49.7 +19.8 
Finland 30.4  36.7  39.9  45.6  44.5 +14.1 
Norway 29.6  39.3  43.0  41.4  45.0 +15.4 
Sweden 35.0  41.6  47.8  48.1  51.1 +16.1 
            
Greece 19.9  21.3  28.0  31.7  35.0* +15.1 
Italy 25.5  25.4  33.6  40.1  41.0 +15.5 
Portugal 15,8  19.7  25.2  31.7  34.5* +18.7 
Spain 14.7  18.4  27.2  32.1  35.8 +21.1 
            
France 34.5  35.5  42.4  42.9  44.3 +9.8 
Germany 31.6  35.3  37.2  37.2  34.7 +3.1 
United Kingdom  30.4  35.3  37.7  35.0  37.2 +6.8 
USA 24.7  25.6  25.6  27.9  26.8 +2.1 
            
OECD (total)**  25.8 29.7  32.9  35.1  35.9* +10.1 
EU-15*  27.9 32.4  37.7  39.2  39.7* +11.8 
** Unweighted mean. 
Note: EU-15 area countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.  
Source: Revenue Statistics 1965-2004, OECD ( www.oecdwash.org/DATA/STATS/taxrevenue.pdf; 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/4/37504406.pdf).  
 
  Fiscal policies in the Nordic countries have been committed to the development of 
a comprehensive welfare state. Since the 1950s, gradual and sustained increases in public 
budgets and tax revenues developed. From the 1960s to the 1980s public expenditure was 
partially loan financed, but in recent times Scandinavian tax revenue is higher of what is 
needed to just cover its public spending. As a response to this situation, the Denmark gov-
ernment’s policy is aiming, for example, at producing an annual budget surplus of around 
2 percent of GDP. The objective is to reduce the public debt from the current level of 45 per-
cent to around 25 percent of GDP in 2010 (Ministry of Finance, 2006). Along the same lines, 
Spain’s public administrations obtained in 2005 their first budget surplus (1.1 per cent of 
GDP) since democracy was reinstated. A year later, the surplus increased to 1.5 per cent of 
GDP. As in the case of Denmark, Government’s objective is to reduce the level of public 
debt to 34 per cent in 2010 (Ministerio de Presidencia, 2005). This figure reflects a clear 
deviation from the situation in other Southern European countries (e.g., Italy and Greece 
had levels of public debt of around 106 percent of GDP in 2006). 
 
  5 Table 4: Legitimation bases for the welfare state in Spain 
  1985 1990 1995  2005 
The Government is responsible for the welfare of each and every 
one of the citizens and has the duty to help them out to solve their 
problems  
 
68 
 
59 
 
62 
 
68 
The Government is responsible only for the welfare of least-
favored citizens and has the duty to help them out to solve their 
problems 
 
-* 
 
17 
 
15 
 
23 
Citizens are themselves responsible for their own welfare and 
have the duty of sorting out their own problems 
 
18 
 
16 
 
16 
 
5 
Don’t  know  13 8 8  4 
Source: CIS, Spanish Sociological Center (Studies 1465, 1880, 1910, 2154, 2187 and 2594, www.cis.es). 
 
Table 5: Less taxes or more expenditure in welfare benefits and publics services 
It is better to reduce taxes and having lower expenditure in welfare benefits and public 
services 
24% 
It is better to spend more in welfare benefits and public services even if it means pay-
ing more taxes 
55% 
Don’t know  21% 
Source: Arriba, Calzada and del Pino (2006: 26).  
 
  As is the case in Nordic countries (Svallfors, 2004), two-thirds of citizens in Spain 
have repeatedly expressed their support for a direct public provision of welfare (Table 4). 
The high proportion of those in favor of the option for “universalistic statism” is high 
among voters for both main right-wing and left-wing parties (Popular Party-PP and So-
cialist Party-PSOE). Such citizens’ attitudinal expressions provide a wide legitimating po-
litical base for the development of the welfare state along the “Nordic path” (Arriba et al., 
2006). Spaniards’ attitudes in favor of universal welfare are corroborated in “negative” by 
their disagreement with a reduction of taxes and, accordingly, of public services (Table 5). 
In this way the reticence to pay more taxes is contrasted by a favorable disposition to keep 
public services and a universal welfare state (del Pino, 2004). 
 
2.2. High female participation in the formal labor market 
 
  Employment rates for women in Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden) currently reach around 70 percent, while those of South European countries are 
in the bottom part of EU’s ranking with percentages around 50 percent, except for the case 
of Portugal.6 Increases in female labor participation in EU Mediterranean countries have 
been not only notable, but have reached quantum-leap proportions in the case of Spain: 22 
percentage points in little more than 10 years to reach the rate of 53 per cent in 2006. If 
Spain’s total female employment was nearly 20 percentage points behind that of EU-15 in 
1995, the difference has been reduced to around 5 percentage points in 2006 (Table 6).  
                                                 
6Mainly for historical reasons, Portugal has traditionally had a greater proportion of working wom-
en in the formal labor market than its South European counterparts. Already in 2002 it had already 
accomplished the goal put forward by the European Employment Strategy according to the objec-
tives set in the Lisbon Strategy of reaching 60 percent of total female employment in 2010 (Capucha 
et al., 2005). 
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Table 6: Women’s employment rates in Nordic and Southern Europe (1993-2006) 
 
1995  1998 2004  2006  ▲93- 06 
Denmark 66.7  70.2  71.6  73.4  +6.7 
Finland 59.0  61.2  65.6  67.3  +8.3 
Norway N.A.  73.6*  72.2 72.2 -1.4 
Sweden 68.8  67.9  70.5  70.7  +1.9 
     
Greece 38.1  40.5  45.2  47.4  +9.3 
Italy 35.4  37.3  45.2  46.3  +10.9 
Portugal 55.0 58.2 61.7 62.0 +7.0 
Spain 30.7  35.8  48.3  53.2  +22.5 
          
UE-15  49.2 51.6 56.8 58.7 +9.5 
UE-25 N.A.  51.8 55.7 57.6 +5.8** 
∗ 2000 
**1998-2006 
Note: The female employment rate is calculated by dividing the number of women aged 15 to 64 in 
employment by the total female population of the same age group. The indicator is based on the EU 
Labor Force Survey. 
Source: Eurostat (2008, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/)  
 
  More relevant to our discussion are those data concerning labor participation in the 
central ages of women’s vital cycles (25-49 years), a period of time when women often con-
front not only a demanding job careers but also a greater household involvement related 
to reproduction and child care activities. In the same period 1995-2006, the employment 
rate for the age-group of 25-49 years increased 25 percentage points to reach 67 percent, a 
percentage not too distant from the mean figure for EU-15 (see Table 7). 
 
  Likewise, a look at Table 8 shows how female activity rates in Spain have more 
than doubled in the age group of 25-54 years since the time of transition to democracy in 
1976, from 29 percent to nearly 70 percent. This latter figure is not far behind that corres-
ponding to the total Nordic female employment rate. If this trend of increasing female par-
ticipation in the Spanish formal labor market were to be sustained, we would witness a 
further convergence with the European Union in the not-too-distant future. This develop-
ment was simply unthinkable a few years ago. 
 
  Indeed, the paradigm of labor activation embraced by EU’s countries has in Spain a 
case where economic growth has been reconciled with welfare development. The Spanish 
situation is far from that of the Scandinavian’s “flexicurity.” However, the strategy of labor 
flexibility and reduction of corporate payroll contributions – so that hiring more vulner-
able employees could be facilitated – runs along a moderate but sustained pattern of social 
protection expansion. 
 
 
 
 
 
  7 Table 7: Female employment rates for in EU-15 for the age-group of 25-49 years  
(selected countries, 1995-2006). 
 
 1995  1998  2002  2006  ▲95-06 
Denmark 77.4  79.2  81.0  82.8  +5.4 
Finland 71.1  75.6  79.6  78.9  +7.8 
Sweden 81.6  76.7  82.4  82.1  +0.5 
           
Greece 51.1  54.1  57.9  62.9  +11.9 
Italy 49.0  50.6  56.1  61.1  +12.1 
Portugal 71.0  73.6  76.2  76.6  +5.6 
Spain 42.0  46.8  57.0  67.0  +25.0 
           
France 60.0  68.7  72.4  75.9  +15.9 
Germany 67.4  69.1  72.8  74.4  +7.0 
United Kingdom  69.9  72.1  74.1  74.3  +4.4 
           
EU-15  62.3  64.3  68.6  71.7  +7.4 
Note: Data have been extracted from different quarter in the same year. 
Source: Eurostat (2005; http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/) 
 
Table 8: Female activity rates in Spain (1976-2003) 
 
Age groups  1976  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2004 
16-19 48.6  40.0  32.0  30.2  21.8  20.8  19.4 
20-24 53.4  54.7  54.5  61.2  57.9  57.3  58.0 
25- 54  29.1  30.4  35.6  47.9  56.5  63.5  69.41 
+55 13.8  11.2  10.0  9.0 8.5 8.9 10.5 
Total 28.5  27.8  29.0  35.6  37.9  41.8  45.82 
             175.2% (EU-15) 
             2 62.7% (EU-15 
Source: Spanish Active Population Survey (http://www.ine.es/) and EU’s Labor Force Survey 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/). 
 
3. Spain’s societal changes and welfare reforms 
 
  As in other European countries, population aging and economic immigration in 
Spain (around four million residents in 2006)7 are regarded as having far-reaching reper-
                                                 
7Who were registered in the municipal registers of inhabitants or padrón municipal. At the end of 
2006, there were nearly two million immigrant employees who were in the contributory social in-
surance system (more than 10 percent of the affiliated workers) (Moreno Fuentes, 2007). 
  8 cussions for social policymaking. However, two sociopolitical transformations can be sin-
gled out as having the greatest impact on developments in the foreseeable future of Span-
ish welfare: (1) the increase of women's participation in the paid labor market; and (2) the 
decentralization of social policy provision and the federalization of politics. 
 
3.1. Household and work, resilient familialism? 
 
  Despite its precarious welfare equilibrium, Mediterranean countries have wit-
nessed the transition from a traditional male breadwinner model8 to one of “family and kin 
solidarity” (Naldini, 2003). The transfer of caring responsibilities from young parents to 
other relatives or grandparents–generally women, or “granny-mothers”–9 has traditionally 
reinforced the cultural bases of the familialist welfare regime in Southern Europe.10 These 
practices can be regarded as the main resource to conciliate both jobs and household ac-
tivities, which are very different from those in the Nordic countries. Not surprisingly, 
family and inter-generation strong micro-solidarity11 has perversely permitted a limited 
and usually passive state intervention, in many cases “unfriendly,” towards working 
mothers (Trifiletti, 1999; Saraceno,2000).  
 
  As the hyperactivity of cohorts of “superwomen”12 vanishes gradually and “ambi-
valent familialism” transforms itself, there is a serious vacuum emerging in welfare pro-
vision which will have enduring effects in social policymaking. The increasing externaliza-
tion of personal care services traditionally provided by the family has taken a particular 
turn in Spain, as in other South European countries. Such services are increasingly “pur-
chased” from immigrants at low cost (sometimes in the “underground” economy). This 
process has been recent and swift, something which reiterates preferences in Southern 
Europe for contingent solutions (Ranci, 1999; Moreno Fuentes et al., 2006). Developments 
in this case have unfolded along the lines of the liberal Anglo-Saxon model of private pref-
                                                 
8A model which is rejected by the big majority of Spaniards: just 15 percent of the population agrees 
that males should get the “bread” and females take care of domestic work, including care for chil-
dren (CIS, 2004, Barometer 2556, www.cis.es). However, women continue to carry out most domes-
tic activities. In 1996, Spanish women worked on average four hours and thirty minutes more than 
men did in household activities. In 2001 the difference had been reduced by seventeen minutes. At 
this rate, it would take eighty years for the time spent by women and men in housework to become 
equal (MTAS, 2003). 
9According to data provided by the Family-Employment Compatibilization (Encuesta de Compatibili-
zación Familia-Empleo), “granny mothers” are indispensable in the conciliation of family and work 
for around 40 percent of working mothers (Fernández-Cordón and Tobío, 2005: 30). 
10In Spain, three-quarters of working mothers have a close relative living in the same town; in more 
than half of the cases it is their own mother (Tobío, 2001). 
11The Spanish severely poor, within an income level equal or lower to a quarter of the mean figure 
for the per head equivalized household income, reach the figure of 36 percent–when individually 
counted–but are only 5 percent of Spain’s total population when the aggregated domestic income 
within households is taken into account (Carabaña and Salido, 2001). 
12Cohorts of women, now aged between forty and sixty-four, who could only undertake demanding 
professional activities in the labor market if they were prepared to combine them with traditional 
unpaid caring work in households, typify Spanish “superwomen” across all Spanish social groups, 
classes and geographical areas (Moreno, 2004). 
  9 erence for market provision, rather than for the institutionalization of public structural 
reforms, as often implemented in the Nordic countries.13 
 
  The key question about these contingent strategies is whether their effectiveness for 
women’s well-being can be sustained for long without structural reforms. A look at the 
evolution of fertility rates among Spanish women is very illustrative in trying to answer 
the question. Contrary to other patterns in Continental Europe, Spanish women partici-
pate primarily in the labor market on a full-time basis,14 something which makes the 
“compatibilization” of domestic and paid work all the more difficult. Among other factors, 
the decline of fertility rates can be correlated with the steady increase in female labor 
participation (see Graph 1).  
 
Graph 1. Employment and fertility rates in Spain 
(Women, 25-49 years, 1986-2004).
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  Once the generation of “superwomen” gradually disappears, younger generations 
of women confront a situation of a continuous postponement of first births. If this phe-
nomenon is common to most developed countries, the Spanish and Southern European 
peculiarity concerns the acute loss of reproductive opportunities (Esping-Andersen, 2007). 
As a consequence, and despite the resilience of the Mediterranean family, one of its crucial 
elements appears to be in crisis. Furthermore, low fertility rates have taken place in paral-
lel with an accentuated aging of the population (a trend partly “balanced” by the impact of 
massive immigration). All these transformations underscore the decisive importance of 
family policies, and those policies associated with household life, for the future welfare 
development in Spain.  
 
                                                 
13In political terms, dirigiste state intervention in family matters in Spain still recalls authoritarian 
policies of Franco’s dictatorship (Valiente, 1995). 
14In 2000, just 8 percent of the Spanish were dual-earner couples with children in which women 
were part-timers, a percentage which contrasted with those of 53 percent in the Netherlands, 40 
percent in the United Kingdom, or 33 percent in Germany (Moreno, 2007b). 
  10 3.2. Federalization, growing disparities? 
 
  The territorial form of the state greatly affects welfare provision and institutional 
responsibilities (Moreno and McEwen, 2005). As a result of intrastate variations, often re-
flected in different party systems, channels of elite representation and interest articulation, 
decentralization has become a major embedding factor in contemporary political life in 
Europe. In some countries it is affecting the very “core” of traditional social policies. In 
Spain, universal health care, for instance, has been decentralized in various degrees and 
manners allowing the establishment of regional systems of health provision (Guillén, 
2002). The regional implementation of Spanish welfare policies has so far allowed for a 
great deal of autonomy in the direction of management.  
 
  The decentralization of economic development policies has gone hand in hand 
with the decentralization of political institutions and the further regionalization of welfare 
policies, particularly those concerning assistance and social services of primary care. Span-
ish sub-state layers of government have found in the principle of European subsidiarity a 
renewed impulse for the running of public affairs, and new opportunities for policy ex-
perimentation. There is certainly a case for sub-state units to become “laboratories of de-
mocracy.” It has been argued that the greater the need for innovation (for example, a 
“new” problem or solution), the greater is the rationale for that function to be provided by 
the subnational (sub-state) government (Beer, 1993; Donahue, 1997). In Spain the payoff 
from innovation has so far exceeded the advantages of uniformity and has underlined 
policy diffusion as a criterion. Welfare innovative and “credit-claiming” policies have been 
made possible, as in other areas of policymaking, by the regions’ ability to optimize both 
the non-categorical transfer of financial resources from the central treasury and their own 
regionally-raised revenue. The territorial pattern of public expenditure in Spain has dra-
matically changed in the last twenty-five years (see Table 9). Both autonomy and financial 
resources have allowed mesogovernments the implementation of new welfare programs 
(e.g. minimum income schemes) that could have hardly been tried in a centralized coun-
try.15  
 
  Spanish regional economic disparities have been reduced, a development which 
has translated into a regional convergence in terms of per capita GDP (see Table 10).16 As a 
result those regions with lower income levels have grown at a faster pace than those with 
higher income levels. Certainly a progressive fiscal system notably helps to improve the 
disposable family income in those Spanish poorer regions (Parellada and Álvarez, 2006). As 
counter-intuitive as it may seem, the decentralization of power has contributed to the 
equalization of economic resources in Spain. Concerning welfare provision, mesogovern-
ments have been able to integrate social services and social assistance policies into a com-
mon regionally-based network which facilitates universal access to residents.  
 
 
                                                 
15These are non-contributory programs regionally implemented by the seventeen Spanish Comuni-
dades Autónomas with the general aim of social insertion for low-income or non-income families. Ac-
cording to 2004 data by the Spanish Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs there were nearly 100,000 
households in Spain receiving these means-tested benefits. 
16Despite lower income levels, in general, than in Northern and Central European countries, the pace of 
economic growth by Spanish regions in higher when it is compared to that of those European regions.  
  11 Table 9: Territorial Distribution of Public Expenditure in Spain (1981-2002) (%) 
 
  1981  1984 1987 1990 1993 1996  1999  2002 
CENTRAL 87.3  75.6  72.6  66.2  58.3  58.9 56.2 48.7 
REGIONAL 3.0  12.2  14.6  20.5  25.8  26.9 28.2 35.5 
LOCAL 9.7  12.1  12.8  13.3  15.9  14.2 15.6 15.8 
Source: MAP (1997) for years 1981-90, and MAP (2002) for years 1993-2002. 
Notes: (a) During 1999-2002, strong regional increases corresponded to the decentralization of educa-
tion and health to all seventeen Comunidades Autónomas. 
(b) Spending on social insurance pensions has not been taken into account as it would introduce a bias 
were it to be included as a central government matter. 
 
Table 10: Convergence of Spanish per capita regional GDP in the EEC/EU (1980-2003) (%) 
 
  1980 (EEC) 2003 (EU-15) 2003 (EU-25) 
Andalusia 56  68  74 
Aragon 76  95  104 
Asturias 77  76  83,0 
Balearics 86  102  112 
Basque Country  89  111  121 
Canaries 59  83  91 
Cantabria 78  86  94 
Castille-La Mancha  61  69  76 
Castille and Leon  70  83  90 
Catalonia 83  108  118 
Extremadura 45  59  64 
Galicia 61  70  77 
La Rioja  88  98  107 
Madrid 81  118  129 
Murcia 65  75  82 
Navarre 90  113  123 
Valencia 71  84  92 
SPAIN 71  89  97 
Note: The per capita GDP is in power purchasing parities. European GDP is the base 100. 
Source: Parellada and Álvarez (2006, Table 7). 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
  Deep political and social transformations in Spain have given rise to big questions 
about future scenarios for welfare development. During the last decades there has been a 
further intensification of the “Nordic path,” manifested in an expansion of welfare entitle-
ments (universal health care and education), together with an extension of social services. 
However, analytical attention ought to be paid to the evolution of those two specific areas 
sketchily examined above these lines. 
 
  First, reform concerning household-employment relationship stands out for its po-
tential knock-on effects and implications for the whole of welfare arrangement and institu-
  12 tions in Spain. Sorting out the apparent conflict between society’s expectations of women’s 
role as mothers and their professional aspirations would be crucial in order to adapt the 
familialist Mediterranean welfare regime to the dual challenge of increasing labor produc-
tivity growth and preserving social cohesion (Salido, 2006). Besides the sharing of domes-
tic activities, other measures for greater gender equality could be implemented also for 
those women unable to enter the labor market or willing to devote themselves entirely to 
family life. Caring credits or credit allowances, together with a panoply of fiscal measures, 
should effectively–and legally–recognize the material nature of unpaid (principally caring) 
activities within households, and to promote gender equality.17  
 
  Among the concrete government initiatives favoring the reconciliation of work and 
family life, the number of crèches and places for children aged 0-2 years should be sub-
stantially increased.18 Such policy implementation would add to the practically universal 
pre-school attendance in Spain (3-5 years),19 and compulsory and universal education for 
those aged 6-15 years. Such initiatives cannot be expected to reverse overnight a long-
standing “familialist” culture or, let alone, to “de-familialize” welfare arrangements in 
Mediterranean Spain. In fact, a general policy toward the family is lacking in Spain. Partial 
and expedient policies have been implemented in recent times in the light of pressing so-
cietal developments like the sudden drop in birth rates or the exponential massive entry of 
women into the formal labor market. It is difficult to assess whether such policies promote 
activation, redistribution or are pronatalist. The lack of a tradition of woman-friendliness 
in social policymaking in Spain has combined with an urge to comply with the aims set by 
the Lisbon Agenda and the fertility deficit so that the implementation of policies “to-
wards” the family often lacks a clear programmatic purpose (Salido and Moreno, 2007). 
However, they have been resisted in many instances by the hierarchy of the Roman Catho-
lic Church, which has shown great discomfort and uneasiness with some policies of the 
Spanish “Nordic path.” All things considered, those policies of reconciliation of work and 
family life and equality between women and men may provide the institutional means 
and bases for the promotion of choice for women in either to do unpaid work or not, or to 
engage in paid or unpaid work (Lewis, 1997).  
 
  Second, the territorial structure of Spain–a “federation in disguise”20–appears to 
have the greater impact for the expansion and extension of welfare policies. Spain is a 
highly decentralized state with a meso-level very dynamic in policy innovation, including 
provision of social services. Their input would be crucial for the implementation of the 
                                                 
17The Law for the Effective Equality Between Women and Men (Ley Orgánica para la Igualdad Efectiva 
entre Mujeres y Hombres) passed in 2007 has introduced measures of positive discrimination with 
respect, among other issues, to parental and family leaves or working time reduction. 
18According to the electoral promise of the governing Socialist Party, 300,000 new places should be 
created raising the coverage up to 33 percent of all children aged 0-2 years by the year 2012. A simi-
lar measure was already promised during the electoral campaign of the 2004 elections and was 
largely unfulfilled.  
19Attendance rates in the academic year 2006-07 were: 96 percent (children aged 3 years), 100 per-
cent (aged 4 years) and 100 percent (aged 5 years).Two-thirds of the total were in public schools and 
one-third in private/concerted schools (Valiente, 2008) 
20Except for the dysfunctional operation of the Senate as chamber of territorial representation of the 
citizens of the Comunidades Autónomas, Spain’s system of government satisfies the criterion of being 
considered a federal country (Moreno, 2007a). 
  13 recently approved Law on Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Care of Dependent Peo-
ple (2007), which has established a universal and legally enforceable entitlement for care 
not only for the frail elderly but for all those citizens who lack personal autonomy.21 The 
model of provision would not be one of centralized “command-and-control,” but one 
which should be worked out gradually by intergovernmental agreement with respect to 
practicalities and, more importantly, funding by the three main layers of government.  
 
  While respecting the principles of democratic accountability and territorial sub-
sidiarity multi-level governance in Spain is not likely to be recentralized at the state level. 
Spain’s new welfare seems to validate the thesis that countries with fragmented political 
institutions and a decentralized state organization may move faster and be more respon-
sive in the development of new policies covering “new social risks” (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). 
The risk of exacerbating interregional inequalities in welfare provision is always latent. 
However, and up until now, the imitation or “mimesis effect” among the regions has 
proved to be an effective “credit-claimer” barrier against open discrimination among 
them. As a result, “demonstration” practices and policy innovation have so far prevented 
the well-known practices of inter-governmental “blame avoidance,” and acted as a de facto 
equalizer of policy output. 
 
  Spain’s case of welfare development is interesting to follow closely as some lessons 
could be drawn with regard to the situation of other emerging worlds of welfare capital-
ism, e.g. Eastern Europe (Guillén & Palier, 2004). Indeed there is a “Nordic path” clearly 
identifiable in the Spanish welfare state, which concerns universal access to education, 
health care, non-contributory pensions and access to social services. The labor activation 
and liberalization which have witnessed the accelerated economic growth in recent dec-
ades have also run in parallel with the construction of more protective welfare systems 
along the lines of the “Nordic path”. It remains to be seen whether such a process would 
make Spain’s via media to appear less continental and more Nordic within the future 
worlds of advanced welfare capitalism.
∗ 
 
                                                 
21The Law establishes a “dependency system” which will provide services to dependent citizens 
(day care, household help or residential homes) and benefits to main care providers. The risk of de-
pendency or lacking personal autonomy loses, therefore, its individual character and becomes a so-
cial risk. It is estimated that the total cost of the System of Protection for Dependent People in 2015 
will be 9,355 billion euros and that 300,000 direct jobs will be created (as a consequence, by 2010 
Spain’s GDP should have grown by 1.6 percent) (Rodríguez-Cabrero, 2005). 
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